

## Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9693

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 0341

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: AIR MANPOWER: WG STUDY OF U.S. PROPOSALS

REF: A) STATE 8358; B) USNATO 229; C) USNATO 7008; D)

STATE 263866; E) USNATO 151

1. WG DEVOTED JANUARY 21 MEETING TO U.S. AIR MANPOWER PROPOSALS (REF A). DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON PRELIMINARY OUTLINE WHICH STAFF GROUP PREPARED FOLLOWING PRESENTATION OF U.S. PROPOSALS TO SPC JANUARY 16 AND SPC REQUEST THAT THE WG STUDY THIS SUBJECT. DRAFT OUTLINE (NOT REPORTED TO WASHINGTON) WAS HELPFUL IN THAT IT STATED U.S. PROPOSALS WOULD MAINTAIN PRIMARY FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS AND WOULD NOT SET A PATTERN FOR OTHER ALLIES IN PHASE II. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, AT SUGGESTION OF U.S. MISSION OFFICERS, DID NOT ENTER INTO DETAILED ANALYSIS OF IMPLICATIONS OF U.S. PROPOSALS FOR PHASE II.

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2. FRG REP (DZIALAS), DRAWING IN PART ON PAPER FRG PRESENTED TO SPC (REF B), SAID U.S. PROPOSALS REPRESENTED A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT FROM EXISTING ALLIED POSITION, WHICH COULD HAVE FAR-REACHING IMPACT. FRG HAS CONSIDERABLE RESERVATIONS

ABOUT INTRODUCING AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS, INCLUDING THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PHASE II, IS ESSENTIAL. IN LIGHT OF BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. PROPOSALS, ALLIES SHOULD NOT EXPECT AN EARLY CONCLUSION OF THESE STUDIES. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION, FRG REP OBJECTED TO SOME STATEMENTS IN STAFF GROUP DRAFT, FOR EXAMPLE THAT U.S. PROPOSALS WOULD MAINTAIN FOCUS ON GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, WHICH FRG REP SAID WERE NOT BACKED UP BY ANALYSIS.

3. UK REP (GERAHTY) GENERALLY SUPPORTED STAFF GROUP APPROACH, BUT SAID UK BELIEVES STUDY SHOULD ATTEMPT TO POINT OUT TO SPC HOW SOVIETS MIGHT WANT TO TAKE ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS AND POSSIBLE EFFECT OF THESE REDUCTIONS ON SOVIET CAPABILITIES. HE HOPED U.S. COULD PROVIDE SOME INPUT ON THIS ISSUE AS WELL AS REPLY TO UK QUESTIONS SUBMITTED AT DECEMBER 17 MEETING (REF C). UK REP SAID STUDY SHOULD POINT UP POSITIVE ASPECTS OF U.S. PROPOSAL AND NOT SIMPLY DWELL ON RISKS AND POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS.

4. NETHERLANDS REP (VAN DER GRAAF) SAID STUDY SHOULD PROVIDE ANALYSIS OF PHASE II. REDUCTIONS IN LIGHT OF U.S. PROPOSALS. HE HOPED SHAPE COULD CONTRIBUTE TO SUCH STUDY.

5. SHAPE REP (NEUBROCH) SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW EXACTLY WHAT CUTS U.S. WOULD TAKE IN AIR MANPOWER. HE BELIEVED SHAPE WOULD WANT TO COMMENT ON EFFECT OF U.S. PROPOSALS ON MILITARY BALANCE. U.S. REP (MCCORMACK) POINTED OUT COMPOSITION OF REDUCTION PERCENTAGES WOULD BE DETERMINED LATER IN NEGOTIATIONS. EARLIER U.S. PAPER (REF D) HAD EXPLAINED EFFECTS ON CAPABILITIES OF 5, 10, AND 15 PERCENT REDUCTIONS. SHAPE REP REQUESTED ADDITIONAL U.S. COMMENT ON EFFECT OF 15 PERCENT AIR MANPOWER REDUCTION ON COMBAT CAPABILITY (READINESS AND QRA). WAS IT CORRECT TO INFER FROM NEXT TO LAST PARA IN U.S. PAPER (REF D) THAT DEGRADATION OF RESPONSIVENESS WOULD BE ONLY IN COMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONICS AREA?

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6. CANADIAN REP (BARTLEMAN) PRESENTED FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ON U.S. AIR MANPOWER PAPER (REF D). BEGIN TEXT: DO FIGURES ON MANNING ESTIMATES IN SECTION II A REPRESENT REAL SAVINGS PER AIRCRAFT, OR DO THEY REFLECT CHANGE IN POLICY FOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE, INCLUDING CIVILIANIZATION? WE NOTE THAT IN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE U.S. PHASE I AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, PAPER TALKS OF CIVILIANIZATION AND DEGRADATION OF CERTAIN CAPABILITIES AND FACILITIES TO ACHIEVE PROPOSED 10 AND 15 PERCENT REDUCTIONS. IF LATTER CALCULATIONS ARE BASED ON REQUIREMENTS FOR CURRENT AIRCRAFT (F4), PAPER SHOULD MAKE THIS CLEAR AND PERHAPS SOME EVALUATION SHOULD BE MADE OF SITUATION WHICH WILL PREVAIL AFTER REPLACEMENT OF F4. IS USA CONFIDENT THAT AIR MANPOWER RESTRICTIONS WOULD

INHIBIT MODERNIZATION OF WP AIR FORCES (SECTION III B)?  
IS IT NOT POSSIBLE THAT, LIKE U.S., SOVIETS MAY ALSO HAVE  
FOUND WAY TO REDUCE MAN TO AIRCRAFT RATIO AT LEAST WITHIN NGA?  
END TEXT

7. U.S. REP URGED WG TO PROCEED EXPEDITIOUSLY WITH STUDY IN  
ORDER NOT TO DELAY SPC CONSIDERATION OF U.S. PROPOSALS. ACTING  
CHAIRMAN SAID STAFF GROUP WOULD PROVIDE NEW DRAFT STUDY  
REFLECTING DISCUSSION AT MEETING. WG AGREED TO RETURN TO THIS  
ISSUE JANUARY 28.

8. COMMENT: MISSION OFFICERS HAVE WORKED CLOSELY WITH WG  
STAFF IN ATTEMPTING TO DIRECT STUDIES SPC AND WG MEMBERS  
REQUESTED INTO ONE BRIEF PAPER NARROWLY FOCUSED ON U.S.  
PROPOSALS. MISSION BELIEVES IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO GET WG  
PAPER TO SPC IN ORDER TO SATISFY DESIRE OF SOME ALLIES FOR  
AGREED MILITARY TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. PROPOSALS AS  
PREREQUISITE TO SPC CONSIDERATION OF GUIDANCE TO AD HOC GROUP.  
WASHINGTON RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS ON U.S. AIR MANPOWER PAPER  
WILL EXPEDITE WG STUDY.

9. ACTION REQUESTED: BY JANUARY 27, (A) WASHINGTON COMMENT  
ON REVISED STAFF GROUP DRAFT PAPER TRANSMITTED BELOW, AND (B)  
WASHINGTON REPLIES TO QUESTIONS ON U.S. PAPER CONTAINED IN  
PARAS 5 AND 6 ABOVE AND USNATO 151 AND 7008. WASHINGTON MAY  
WISH TO COMBINE SOME QUESTIONS WHICH ADDRESS SIMILAR ISSUES.  
REPLIES TO AT LEAST SOME OF THESE QUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY THOSE  
ON IMPLICATIONS OF CIVILIANIZING AIR MANPOWER AND POSSIBLE  
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EFFECTS ON SOVIET CAPABILITIES, WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF  
RECEIVED IN TIME FOR JANUARY 28 WG MEETING.

10. FOLLOWING IS STAFF GROUP PAPER ON U.S. AIR MANPOWER  
PROPOSALS.

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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1. THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER IS TO PROVIDE AN ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE US PROPOSAL ON AIR MANPOWER OF 15 JAN 75. THIS ANALYSIS IS BASED PRIMARILY ON PREVIOUS WORKING GROUP EXAMINATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCLUDING AIR MANPOWER IN MBFR.

2. THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE US PROPOSAL ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN A COMBINED (GROUND PLUS AIR) COMMON CEILING. THIS MEANS THAT THE ULTIMATE RESULT OF REDUCTIONS IN BOTH PHASES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE AN EQUAL TOTAL LEVEL (NUMBER) OF GROUND AND AIR PERSONNEL ON BOTH SIDES. THE COMBINED (GROUND PLUS AIR) COMMON CEILING WOULD BE SET AT AN ILLUSTRATIVE FIGURE OF 900,000 MEN.

B. IN PHASE I, THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION EACH REDUCE 15 PCT OF THE TOTAL OF THEIR GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA.

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C. US AND SOVIET PHASE I REDUCTIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO INCLUDE AT LEAST 15 PCT OF US AND OF SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA. SOVIET GROUND REDUCTIONS WOULD CONTINUE TO CONSIST OF A TANK ARMY OF ABOUT 68,000 GROUND PERSONNEL AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

D. THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO INCLUDE SOME AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN ITS PHASE I REDUCTIONS WITHIN THE OVERALL 15 PCT MANPOWER REDUCTIONS DESCRIBED IN PARA B. ABOVE. THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF THE MANPOWER REDUCTION PERCENTAGES WOULD BE A MATTER FOR DETERMINATION IN A LATER POINT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

E. THE US WILL NOT PRESS ANY ALLY TO INCLUDE AIR PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II AND WILL SUPPORT ANY ALLY IF IT DECIDES NOT TO INCLUDE REDUCTIONS OF ITS AIR PERSONNEL. THE US DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS APPROACH CREATES ANY PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II OTHER THAN OPTIONAL INCLUSION OF AIR

MANPOWER IN REDUCTIONS MADE BY INDIVIDUAL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS  
(OF BOTH SIDES).

3. FOR THE PURPOSE OF SHOWING THE NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF THE US PROPOSAL, THE FOLLOWING MANPOWER STRENGTHS OF NATO AND WP ARE USED (1).

	NATO	WP
US AIR	34,000	SOV AIR 65,000
NON-US AIR	162,000	NSWP AIR 143,000
TOTAL AIR	196,000	208,000
US GROUND	193,000	SOVIET GROUND 479,000
NON-US GROUND	598,000	NSWP GROUND 458,000
TOTAL GROUND	791,000	937,000
TOTAL FORCES	987,000	TOTAL FORCES 1,145,000

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(1) THE NATO FIGURES ARE THOSE CONTAINED IN AC/276(SGDS)  
-N/29 FOR END 1973; WP FIGURES ARE THOSE SHOWN IN MCM-86-74  
FOR MID 74, ROUNDED TO THE NEAREST THOUSAND.  
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4. THE NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF THE US PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT TO  
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PHASE I ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. TOTAL AIR AND GROUND FORCES TO BE REDUCED BY EACH SIDE  
(15 PCT OF AIR PLUS GROUND MANPOWER):

	US	SOVIET
AIR	34,000	AIR 65,000
GROUND	193,000	GROUND 479,000
	15 PCT X 227,000 EQUALS 34,050	15 PCT X 544,000 EQUALS 81,600

B. THE ABOVE TOTAL AIR PLUS GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS MUST  
INCLUDE GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OF AT LEAST 15 PCT OF US  
AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA. REQUIRED GROUND  
FORCE REDUCTIONS MUST BE AT LEAST:

	US	SOVIET
	15 PCT X 193,000 EQUALS 28,950	15 PCT X 479,000 EQUALS 71,850

C. UNDER THE PROPOSAL THE US WOULD BE WILLING TO  
REDUCE SOME AIR MANPOWER (NOT EXCEEDING 15 PCT OF US AIR  
MANPOWER IN THE NGA) IN ORDER TO REACH THE REQUIRED TOTAL OF  
AIR PLUS GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OF 34,050. THE SOVIETS  
WOULD NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO REDUCE AIR MANPOWER TO REACH  
THEIR REQUIRED REDUCTION TOTAL OF 81,600. THUS AIR MANPOWER  
REDUCTIONS FOR THE SOVIETS COULD VARY FROM NONE UP TO  
9,750 (81,600-71,850). US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS COULD  
AMOUNT TO AS MUCH AS 5,100 (34,050-28,950); UNDER THE TERMS  
OF THE PROPOSAL AND BEARING IN MIND THE OBJECTIVE, THERE  
COULD BE SOME US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. THE MAXIMUM  
POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN AIR MANPOWER (5,100 FOR THE US AND 9,750

FOR THE SOVIETS) REPRESENT 15 PCT OF THE US AND SOVIET AIR  
MANPOWER IN THE NGGMV

GMV THE FOLLOWING TABLE SHOWS THE NUMBER OF AIR AND GROUND  
MANPOWER PERSONNEL EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE ASSUMING  
REDUCTIONS OF AIR MANPOWER, FOR BOTH SIDES, RANGING FROM  
ZERO THROUGH 5 PCT AND 10 PCT TO A MAXIMUM OF 15 PCT.

	US REDUCTIONS		SOVIET REDUCTIONS	
	AIR	GROUND	AIR	GROUND
0 PCT	0	34,050	0	81,600
5 PCT	1,700	32,350	3,250	78,350

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10 PCT	3,400	30,650	6,500	75,100
15 PCT	5,100	28,950	9,750	71,850

E. THE GROUND MANPOWER REDUCTIONS SHOWN IN THE PRECEDING  
PARAGRAPH EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF US OR SOVIET GROUND  
FORCES  
IN THE NGA ARE:

US	SOVIET
32,350 EQUALS 16.8 PCT	81,600 EQUALS 17.0 PCT
30,650 EQUALS 15.9 PCT	78,350 EQUALS 16.4 PCT
28,950 EQUALS 15.0 PCT	75,100 EQUALS 15.7 PCT
	71,850 EQUALS 15.0 PCT

5. THESE PROPOSALS, IF IMPLEMENTED IN PHASE I, WOULD HAVE  
THE EFFECTS AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE ALLIED OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING WITHDRAWAL OF A  
SOVIET TANK ARMY (68,000 MAN, 1,700 TANKS) WOULD BE MAINTAINED.

THE RECIPROCAL US REDUCTIONS WOULD BE EFFECTED FOR GROUND  
FORCES, AS CURRENTLY ENVISAGED, BY A THIN-OUT OF US MANPOWER.  
ADDITIONALLY, US AIR MANPOWER WOULD BE REDUCED TO AN  
EXTENT NOT EXCEEDING 15 PCT IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE ALLIED  
OBJECTIVE OF WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET ARMoured GROUND FORCES.

B. THE REDUCTIONS, SYMMETRICAL IN PERCENTAGE TERMS,  
WOULD BE UNEQUAL IN NUMERICAL TERMS.

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C. THE CURRENT ALLIED PROPOSAL (NAC 2948 220945Z NOV 73) FOR PHASE I REQUIRES THE USSR TO WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF FIVE DIVISIONS. THIS WOULD BE ABOUT 15 PCT OF THE TOTAL SOVIET GROUND FORCES OF 460,000 IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. THE UNITED STATES WOULD ALSO WITHDRAW ABOUT 15 PCT OF ITS TOTAL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF 193,000 SOLDIERS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, I.E. ABOUT 29,000 SOLDIERS. THE NEW US PROPOSAL OF JAN 15 WOULD MAINTAIN THE SAME PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS FOR GROUND FORCES: IT WOULD INCREASE THE REQUIRED REDUCTIONS FOR BOTH US AND USSR BY 15 PCT OF THE MANPOWER STRENGTH OF THE US AND USSR AIR FORCES IN THE AREA: IT WOULD ENABLE BOTH SIDES TO APPLY THAT INCREASE IN REDUCTIONS TO EITHER GROUND OR AIR MANPOWER.

D. THE CURRENT ALLIED PROPOSAL (NAC 2948), WHICH ADDRESSES ONLY GROUND FORCES FOR REDUCTIONS, COULD NECESSITATE DEFINITION OF "GROUND FORCES" BECAUSE OF THE DIFFERENT PRACTICES ADOPTED BY NATO. THE WP, AND INDIVIDUAL NATIONS IN ALLOTING TASKS  
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(E.G.) AREA AIR DEFENCE) TO GROUND AND AIR FORCES. THE INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER IVN THE ELEMENTS ADDRESSED FOR REDUCTIONS, EVEN ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS, WOULD MAKE IT UNNECESSARY TO ADDRESS ANOMALIES AND TO DEFINE GROUND AND AIR FORCES, OTHER THAN BY UNIFORM.

E. THE US AUTHORITIS HAVE EXAMINED (1) THE EFFECTS, FOR THEIR AIR FORCES IN THE NAT GUIDELINES AREA, OF REDUCTIONS IN MANPOWER AT 5 PCT, AND 10 PCT AND 15 PCT. THE US FIND THAT NONE OF THESE WOULD REDUCE THE NUMBERS OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT. A 5 PCT REDUCTION WOULD NOT AFFECT COMBAT CAPABILITY. AT 10 PCT THE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WOULD BEGIN TO BEAR BUT WOULD HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON M-DAY AVAILABILITY OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT, SORTIE RATES, OR INITIAL DEFENCE AND RECEPTION CAPABILITIES.

AN EXCEPTION TO THIS WOULD BE A MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, WHICH COULD BE RETURNED BY M PLUS 3 IF REQUIRED. REDUCTIONS AT 15 PCT, ALTHOUGH NO AFFECTING COMBAT AIRCRAFT NUMBERS, WOULD INVOLVE SOME DEGRADATION OF RESPONSIVENESS AND SUPERVISION IN THE COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS AREA. OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY AND READINESS WOULD BE REDUCED AT M-DAY AND RECEPTION CAPABILITY WOULD BE DEGRADED. DEPENDING UPON DEPLOYMENT PHASING, PERSONNEL AND AIRCRAFT COULD BE RETURNED PRIOR TO M-23. A CRITICAL FACTOR IN THIS CASE (AS WELL AS IN A 10 PERCENT REDUCTION) WOULD BE RELIANCE ON ADEQUATE WARNING TIME. IF THE WARSAW PACT ATTACK COMMENCES PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF FORCES REQUIRED TO REPLACE WITHDRAWN AIR MANPOWER, INITIAL COMBAT CAPABILITY OF IN-PLACE FORCES COULD BE

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(1) US/NATO/POL/OUT/NS/74-154, 2 DEC 74  
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OVER-EXTENDED. RAPID DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY OF NGA TACTICAL UNITS TO A CRISIS AREA IN USAF, BUT OUTSIDE THE NGA, COULD ALSO BE DEGRADED DUE TO THE RELOCATION OF TACTICAL AIRLIFT AND REDUCTION IN MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT THAT MIGHT OCCUR AT A 15 PCT REDUCTION LEVEL.

6. US AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IN THE NGA, EVEN AT THE 15 PCT LEVEL, WOULD NOT REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COMBAT AIRCRAFT IN PLACE. CLARIFICATION HAS BEEN REQUESTED AS TO THE EFFECTS OF MANPOWER REDUCTIONS ON (E.G.) REACTION TIME AND READINESS.

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(MISSION COMMENT: THIS SENTENCE REFERS TO SHAPE QUESTION IN PARA 5 OF THIS CABLE.)

7. THERE IS NEED TO WEIGH ANY DEGRADATION OF ALLIED CAPABILITY INVOLVED IN THESE REDUCTIONS AGAINST THE ADVANTAGE TO BE GAINED BY WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, WHICH OBJECTIVE IS CENTRAL TO THE US PROPOSALS AND ALLIED OBJECTIVES. THIS STUDY ATTEMPTS TO EXAMINE, TO THE EXTENT PRACTICABLE, THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTS FOR THE SOVIETS OF THE ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS (APPROXIMATELY 10,000 MEN), WHETHER TAKEN BY THEM IN GROUND OR AIR FORCES.

8. IF THE SOVIETS CHOOSE TO TAKE THE FULL REDUCTIONS IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER, THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SOVIET WITHDRAWALS REQUIRED (USING NATO DATA) WOULD BE 81,600. OF THESE, 71,800 WOULD APPLY TO GROUND FORCES. THE ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWALS, DERIVING FROM INCLUSION OF AIR MANPOWER, AMOUNT TO 9,750, APPROACHING THE MANPOWER EQUIVALENT OF ONE DIVISION. SUCH A FURTHER REDUCTION OF SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE ALLIED AIM OF REDUCING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES, AT NO ADDITIONAL COST IN GROUND REDUCTIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE. THE COST IN AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS IS DISCUSSED ABOVE (PARA 5E.).



9. ALTERNATIVELY, THE USSR COULD CHOOSE TO APPLY THE ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS TO THEIR AIR MANPOWER IN THE NGA, AT ANY FIGURE UP TO 9,750 (15PCT) OF THEIR AIR MANPOWER. AS STATED IN A PREVIOUS REPORT (AC/276-D(74)9), THE WARSAW PACT (INCLUDING SOVIET) AIRCRAFT: MANPOWER RATIO IS HIGH. THIS IS DUE, AT LEAST IN LARGE PART, TO THE WP PRACTICE OF USING GROUND FORCES TO PROVIDE SOME GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT SERVICES FOR THEIR AIR FORCES. SOVIET AIR MANPOWER IN THEIR AIR FORCE IN THE NGA IS ENGAGED IN OPERATION AND IMMEDIATE GROUND CONTROL AND SUPPORT OF AIRCRAFT. IT IS THEREFORE PROBABLY THAT REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET AIR MANPOWER WOULD BEAR DIRECTLY (TO A GREATER EXTENT THAN FOR THE US AIR FORCES) ON CAPABILITY, READINESS, AND PERHAPS ON THE NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT BASED IN THE NGA. IT IS IMPRACTICABLE, HOWEVER, WITHOUT FULL INFORMATION ON ORGANISATION, MANNING LEVELS, AND MAINTENANCE ARRANGEMENTS TO QUANTIFY THE EFFECTS.

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10. NATO ASSESSMENTS OF SOVIET AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE NGA ARE:

A. COMMAND AND HQ STAFF	4,920
B. FLYING UNITS	39,310
C. AIR DEFENCE	6,690
D. SUPPORT	13,910
E. TOTAL	64,830

REDUCTIONS TAKEN IN A. AND D. MIGHT BEAR LESS ON OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY THAN REDUCTIONS APPLIED TO B. AND C. THIS IS SPECULATIVE, HOWEVER, AND COULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIATED OR QUANTIFIED.

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11. IT IS PROBABLE THAT, IF THE SOVIETS CHOSE TO REDUCE AIR  
 MANPOWER, THEY WOULD DO SO IN THE WAY BEST SUITED TO THEIR PURPOSE  
 AND LEAST DEGRADING IN OPERATIONAL EFFECTS. IN VIEW OF THE  
 PROXIMITY OF SOVIET TERRITORY TO THE REDUCTION AREA,  
 IT IS AT LEAST A POSSIBILITY THAT THE USSR WOULD PREFER TO  
 WITHDRAW SELECTED AIR UNITS TO THE THREE WMDs, RATHER THAN  
 BEAR A MANPOWER REDUCTION WHICH COULD REDUCE READINESS AND  
 CAPABILITY THROUGHOUT THEIR AIR FORCES IN THE NGA. AIR UNITS  
 SO WITHDRAWN COULD BE RAPIDLY REINTRODUCED IN EMERGENCY.

12. THE NUMERICAL EFFECTS OF THE US PROPOSAL WITH RESPECT  
 TO POSSIBLE REMAINING REDUCTIONS TOWARDS THE COMMON CEILING  
 ARE AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE AMOUNT OF PERSONNEL (AIR PLUS GROUND) THAT EACH  
 SIDE WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE TO ARRIVE AT AN ILLUSTRATIVE OVERALL  
 COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 IS AS FOLLOWS:

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	NATO	WP
TOTAL(AIR PLUS GROUND)	987,000	TOTAL(AIR PLUS GROND) 1,145,000
	-900,000	-900,000
OVERALL REQUIRED REDUCTIONS		
EQUALS	87,000	245,000

B. THE NUMBERS OF PERSONNEL (AIR PLUS GROUND) REMAINING TO  
 BE REDUCED AFTER COMPLETION OF PHASE I REDUCTIONS; IN ORDER  
 TO REACH A COMMON CEILING AT THE ILLUSTRATIVE LEVEL OF 900,000  
 ARE:

	NATO	WP
OVERALL REQUIRED REDUCTIONS	87,000	245,000
PHASE I REDUCTIONS	-34,050	-81,600
	52,950	163,400

C. THE US PROPOSAL DOES NOT INDICATE THE MANNER  
 IN WHICH THESE REMAINING REDUCTIONS MIGHT BE DISTRIBUTED  
 BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND. THE VOLUNTARY CHARACTER OF AIR REDUC-

TIONS BY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TAKES ACCOUNT, INTER ALIA, THAT SOME ALLIED NATIONS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN AS TO THE EFFECT OF AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS FOR THEIR OWN AIR FORCES. THE FOLLOWING TABLE ILLUSTRATES THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGES OF NATO GROUND FORCES (INCLUDING US PHASE I REDUCTIONS) THAT WOULD BE REDUCED TO MEET THE ILLUSTRATIVE COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 IF THE US WERE TO REDUCE 5, 10 OR 15 PCT OF ITS AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I (IF THERE WERE TO BE NO FURTHER AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS):

REQUIRED NATO GROUND REDUCTIONS

PHASE I AIR CUT	NUMBERS	PERCENTAGE
5 PCT	85,300 (87,000-1,700)	10.8 PCT (85,300 DIVIDED BY 791,000)
10 PCT	83,600 (87,000-3,400)	10.6 PCT (83,600 DIVIDED BY 791,000)
15 PCT	81,900 (87,000-5,100)	10.4 PCT (81,900 DIVIDED BY 791,000)

D. THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF WP GROUND FORCES THAT WOULD  
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HAVE TO BE REDUCED TO MEET THE ILLUSTRATIVE COMMON CEILING OF 900,000 COULD VARY BETWEEN A MAXIMUM OF 245,000 (26.1 PCT)-WHEN THE SOVIETS HAD REDUCED NO AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I-TO A MINIMUM OF 235,250 (25.1 PCT)- WHEN THE SOVIETS HAD REDUCED 15 PCT (9,750) OF THEIR AIR MANPOWER IN PHASE I.

13. THE NATO GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL (85,300 OR 10.8 PCT ASSUMING A MINIMUM 5 PCT REDUCTION OF US AIR MANPOWER) ARE HIGHER (BY APPROX. 8,000) THAN THOSE ENVISAGED IN THE ORIGINAL ALLIED PROPOSAL AIMED AT A COMMON CEILING OF 700,000. THEY WOULD BE LOWER (BY APPROX. 6,000) THAN THOSE POSTULATED IN REDUCTIONS FROM AGREED NATO GROUND FORCE STRENGTHS (AT END 74) OF 791,000, TO A CEILING AT 700,000. (THE MORE FAVOURABLE RESULT FOR NATO IS LARGELY DUE TO THE FACT THAT, ALTHOUGH THE NAT AIR FORCE MANPOWER IS 196,000, THE ILLUSTRATIVE COMMON CEILING HAS BEEN RAISED BY 200,000 TO 900,000.) NO FURTHER ASSESSMENT CAN BE MADE AT THIS STAGE OF THE OPERATIONAL EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE AIR MANPOWER REDUCTIONS: AS INDICATED IN A PREVIOUS REPORT, ONLY WHEN THE RESULTS ARE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF EFFECTS ON AIRCRAFT NUMBERS AND/OR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY, CAN THE ALLIANCE MILITARY AUTHORITIES UNDERTAKE ANY SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE RISK INVOLVED.  
END TEXT.  
BRUCE

SECRET

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## Message Attributes

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